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Challenging the conventional wisdom that structural problems are to blame for the euro area’s 
protracted domestic demand stagnation, this paper sets out to shed some fresh light on the role 
of the ECB in the ongoing EMU crisis. Contrary to the widely held interpretation of the ECB as 
an inflation targeter—and a rather soft one, too—it is argued that the key characteristic of the 
ECB is the pronounced asymmetry in its policy approach and mindset. Curiously, this 
asymmetry has not only given rise to an antigrowth bias, but to upward price pressures and 
distortions as well. There is a link between stagnation and inflation persistence that owes to the 
ECB’s failure to internalize the euro area’s fiscal regime. This raises the question as to whether 
inflation targeting would have led to better results, or could do so in future.  
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In the ECB’s self-appraisal, the world’s most independent central bank’s performance has been 
an outstanding success story right from the start. This self-complimentary view is not only 
questionable in the light of persistent economic stagnation since 2001, responsibility for which 
the bank notoriously blames on everyone else. Given that the ECB has also missed—what 
according to its first President Wim Duisenberg represents—its “sole” goal, namely, price 
stability (as defined by the ECB as HICP inflation of below 2 percent) for five years in a row, 
the bank’s embellished self-portrait is truly puzzling. 
  In general, academic ECB-watchers have reached a more mixed verdict on the bank’s 
performance. On the one hand, there is a broad consensus that the ECB’s policy strategy and 
communication, despite the strategy reform of June 2003, leaves much to be desired. On the 
other hand, the majority view seems to hold that the ECB’s interest rate polices have not been 
too far off the mark. Commenting on the Duisenberg record, Wyplosz (2003) exemplified this 
ambivalent assessment well when he argued that the ECB’s “faulty strategy” gives the 
“impression that the Eurosystem remains a prisoner of old and simplistic doctrines,” while the 
bank—miraculously, it would seem—still achieved a “nearly impeccable record.”   
  Hence there is currently no perceived need for any fundamental ECB reform. Instead, all 
efforts concentrate on liberalizing the euro zone’s allegedly too “rigid” labor markets—the 
supposed culprit of all troubles. In Brussels on March 2, 2005, Commissioner Almunia 
reconfirmed once again what seems to be the consensus view among the euro zone’s key policy 
makers, namely, that with interest rates at historically low levels and budget deficits around 3 
percent macroeconomic policy stance seems very expansionary already, so that the root cause of 
the ongoing stagnation must lie elsewhere—and reform efforts must thus focus on the 
underlying problem, held to be entirely structural in nature.
1   
                                                         
1 It is worthwhile to recall here Knut Wicksell’s (1898) path-breaking insight that the absolute level of interest rates 
is not an indicator of the monetary stance. Since the ECB adopted a “tightening bias” in September 2004, the bank 
appears keen to raise interest rates towards what it sees as a more neutral level. In truth, however, the ECB’s 
belated and extraordinarily sluggish cuts since 2001 have merely allowed the market rate of interest to trail a 
declining neutral rate towards ever lower levels. Keynes’s (1936) analysis suggests that the ECB’s notorious 
reference to “historically low” interest rates itself may be an important reason for high liquidity preference and for 
monetary growth overshooting the M3 reference value. Of course “high” budget deficits, too, may not reflect a 




  This paper argues that the euro zone’s current single-minded policy and reform 
orientation may turn out to be a fatal mistake. In particular, current debates are characterized by 
a thorough misapprehension of the ECB’s primary role in the current crisis. Far from achieving 
a nearly impeccable record, the ECB has failed dismally on its vital responsibility of managing 
domestic demand growth.  
What follows is an assessment of ECB performance from within an “inflation targeting 
framework;” representing today’s conventional wisdom on how sound monetary policy should 
best be run. Our objective is to investigate whether imposing inflation targeting upon the ECB 
might be the right way forward in refocusing the ECB on output stabilization and growth; the 
bank’s supposed secondary mandate according to the Maastricht Treaty. A key issue is the 
inflation “stickiness” observed in recent years and widely interpreted as evidence of structural 
rigidities. The alternative hypothesis put forward here stresses the counterproductive part played 
by the ECB itself, which not only strangled growth, but also pushed inflation up at the same 
time. Arguably, there could hardly be any clearer evidence for the first-rate macroeconomic 
policy failure that has unfolded in recent years, representing the true cause of the ongoing EMU 
crisis.  
 
IS THE ECB AN INFLATION TARGETER IN DISGUISE?  
 
Suggesting that the ECB should follow inflation targeting may well seem puzzling at first, given 
that in the view of many observers inflation targeting is exactly what the ECB has been doing all 
along; even though in a rather disguised way. For instance, London’s Centre for Economic 
Policy Research, perhaps the most prominent ECB watcher, attested that “… targeting inflation 
is very close to what the ECB has been doing—regardless of the rhetoric—and to what it should 
be doing” (CEPR 2001, p. 2).  
The tenor here is that—for some reason—the ECB tries to obfuscate its inflation 
targeting approach. Yet, while the resulting lack of transparency and the bank’s confusing words 
are surely regrettable, the argument goes, its deeds still bear a clear inflation targeting signature. 
A related issue concerns the ECB’s repeated failure to meet its price stability mandate since 
2000, which is interpreted from this angle as evidence of the bank’s flexible inflation targeting 




allowed inflation to exceed 2 percent, the upper bound of the target range. Any simple charge of 
a deflationary bias in monetary policy is not justified” (CEPR 2002, p. xiv).
2  
Perhaps watching the ECB’s conduct through Anglo-Saxon eyes and inflation targeting 
lenses may be bound to lead to such an interpretation. And I also grant that in the light of 
inflation running above 2 percent since 2000 a “simple” charge of a deflationary bias may not 
be credible. In fact, the charge raised against the ECB in the following is rather more subtle, 
featuring complex interdependencies between monetary and fiscal policies as they have played 
out in the spirit of the Maastricht treaty. The point is that an inflation targeting central bank has 
to properly internalize the fiscal policy regime, in this case: the “Stability and Growth Pact,” just 
as any central bank is well advised to be acquainted with the economic environment, financial 
market climate, and wider policy regime within which it is operating.  
If anything, interpreting the ECB as an inflation targeter may serve to discredit inflation 
targeting; supposedly an “employment-friendly” approach to monetary policy. This 
interpretation thoroughly misreads the ECB’s attitude and intentions as well as the bank’s 
unimpressive achievements. On this point one should rather trust the ECB’s words. The ECB’s 
key leaders, Otmar Issing, Wim Duisenberg, and Jean-Claude Trichet, have not only 
consistently denied that the ECB follows an inflation targeting strategy. They have made it quite 
clear that they reject this approach and consider the ECB’s own “two-pillar framework” as 
superior.  
For instance, more than mere rhetoric (or vanity) was involved, when the ECB’s chief 
economist (and mastermind behind the bank’s strategy and interest rate decisions), Otmar 
Issing, at the press seminar on the evaluation of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy in May 
2003, asserted that “we have confirmed our two-pillar approach. This is totally different from 
what is normally seen as inflation targeting.”
3 Similarly, describing inflation targeting as an 
oversimplification, Mr. Trichet stressed that “we do not rely on an equation or a system of 
equations. We do not rely on a forecast, as is the case in inflation targeting or, perhaps, in the 
previous concept of inflation targeting. When we take a decision, we look at everything, as we 
                                                         
2 More recently the CEPR (2004) even more explicitly interprets persistent inflation above 2 percent as reflecting 
the ECB’s excessive softness.  
3 Referring to Otmar Issing’s “dominating influence in the ECB’s executive Board and Governing Council,” 
Wyplosz (2003: 37) appropriately observed that: “This influence has been made possible by Issing’s exclusive 
control of the ECB staff who prepare policy decisions. His presentations at the start of the Governing Council 
policy meetings are understood as giving him agenda setting power. The Duisenberg years are also the Issing 




do every month” (Monetary Dialogue, 16 February 2004: 6). While this comment implies that 
the ECB pursues its allegedly forward-looking, medium-term oriented approach to price 
stability without a forecast, which is surprising enough, the essential message and underlying 
belief conveyed by the ECB here and elsewhere is that of an outright dismissal of any fine 
tuning. The ECB firmly believes that monetary policy is not about managing the economy. But 
what else, then, is the ECB trying to do?  
 




To understand the ECB it is of vital importance to acknowledge that this bank is firmly attached 
to Bundesbank traditions. It is well known that Germany’s acclaimed guardian of monetary 
stability and the famous strength of the deutschmark provided the blueprint for the structure of 
monetary policy in EMU. In fact, the ECB’s independence even surpasses the Bundesbank’s, 
secured at the constitutional level rather than just by a simple law. The same holds for the 
monetary policy traditions that became established at the ECB, primarily through Otmar Issing 
(formerly the chief economist at the Bundesbank) and Wim Duisenberg (Germany’s first choice 
at the time given that the Bundesbank President, Hans Tietmeyer, himself was not an option).  
These traditions include the ECB’s overall autocratic style and peculiar public relations, 
featuring a passion for continuous public criticisms of issues relating to any other policy area—
paired with the standard dismissal of any criticism of its own policies and practices as an attack 
on its all-important independence. And the same traditions lie behind the ECB’s attitude 
towards, and understanding of, monetary policy, which is well reflected in the ECB’s “two-
pillar framework.” To begin with, the ECB’s “monetary pillar” is not just a polite tribute to 
Bundesbank wisdom. Contrary to what many observers seem to believe, the bank’s pseudo-
monetarism is also of true practical importance. For the ECB uses its “reference value” in the 
same highly discretionary manner as the Bundesbank. In fact, the whole point about the “M 
mantra” is about maximizing discretion, since, at least at some junctures, emphasising M may 
provide a convenient excuse. For instance, at the current juncture, the ECB emphasizes above 
reference-value M3 growth to delay further interest rate cuts. By contrast, the ECB decided to 
play down the sharp slowdown in M3 growth starting in the spring of 2000 and continued on 




Ironically, of course, Buba/ECB practice is actually turning monetarist wisdom on its head: the 
thrust of Milton Friedman’s monetarist agenda was to take away discretion from independent 
central bank politicians. Issing (1997: 72) asserted that the Bundesbank’s “pragmatic 
monetarism” constituted a “successful synthesis of a theoretical basis and practical 
implementation.” Even Germany’s pseudo-monetarist Bundesbank disciples admit though that 
the Bundesbank’s “monetary targeting” was really a hiding shield for protection against political 
interference.  
  As regards the price stability pillar, which many confuse as inflation targeting in 
disguise, the key issue is the pronounced bias in the ECB’s inflation risk assessments and 
application of its interest rate instrument. In fact, the key to “stability-orientation” à la 
Bundesbank is the asymmetry in approach and mindset.
4 Metaphorically speaking, the ECB acts 
like a driver who is quick at slamming the brakes, but notoriously abstains from using the 
accelerator. Obviously, this is not a recipe for smooth driving, which begs the question why it 
seems to have worked for the Bundesbank, and quite well for so long.  
  Essentially, it worked for the Bundesbank because, and as long as, everyone else 
behaved differently. In particular, the Bundesbank’s peculiar driving style worked fine when 
nominal exchange rates were stable, Germany’s trading partners’ inflation generally higher than 
its own, and as the accelerator was applied skilfully “elsewhere in the world economy.”  
Things worked best under Bretton Woods. The situation was then almost replicated under the 
“hard EMS” of the 1980s; with the rest of Europe bearing the economic and fiscal brunt of Buba 
wisdom. As an early warning of things to come, the Maastricht convergence process of 
disinflation cum coordinated fiscal consolidation saw Europe moving towards the brink of 
stagnation by the mid 1990s when the U.S.’s “new era” growth and soaring dollar provided a 
last-minute external lifeline that allowed EMU to go ahead.  
  To Germany’s surprise, exporting the Buba “success story” undermined its working at 
home. Having failed to grasp why the model worked in the past, Germany’s “supply-side-only” 
economists are in hopeless disarray about why it does not work anymore today. Stubbornly 
sticking to the old ways, on their advice, the country is today flirting with “stability-oriented” 
deflation.  
                                                         
4 Accordingly, attempts to recast the Bundesbank as an inflation targeter are similarly beside the point as in the 
ECB’s case (Bernanke and Mihov 1997, Gerlach and Svensson 2003). It just seems to be too tempting to classify a 
central bank with a low inflation record as an inflation targeter. Yet there is a much simpler way to low inflation 




At the same time, Euroland, much to its own surprise too, is finding out that emulating 
the Buba “success story” of asymmetric “management” of domestic demand, while fiscal policy 
is no longer allowed to take up the slack, actually means the opposite of the promised land of 
stability and growth.  
Failing to come to grips with this surprising outcome, Europe’s leadership is imaginative 
at one thing only: inventing structural excuses for protracted domestic demand stagnation and 
blaming the malaise on the rest of the world. If one dared to take a look at an economics 
textbook instead, the spotlight would be on macroeconomic policies as the primary candidate of 
domestic demand stagnation.
5  
Somehow demand management was simply written out of the Maastricht play though—
as stabilization policies were replaced by “stability policy.” More than mere words are at issue 
here. The attitude is that stabilization polices proper are neither necessary nor desirable. 
Maintaining price stability through “stability policy” is the best one can do. Unfortunately, 
unless one can rely on others to do the more difficult part of the job, namely stabilizing the 
economy, simply maintaining price stability is not nearly good enough.  
It is thus something of an irony that Bundesbank wisdom provided the blueprint for the 
Maastricht EMU, as the Bundesbank was actually lacking the skills and experience in properly 
managing the economy. In fact, the whole Buba/ECB attitude is based on the illusion that one 
might get away without proper management—as was indeed true for Germany, but under 
peculiar conditions prevailing in the past. Watching the spreading of the “German disease” with 
amazement, the rest of the world sees a rudderless economic giant drifting along hoping for 
strong enough export currents to pull it along. The rest of the world cannot be pleased about this 
sight, especially in view of soaring global imbalances.  
  The ECB too appears confused about what is happening. Back in 2001 the world’s most 
independent central bank often excused its conspicuous refusal to cut interest rates by arguing 
that occurrences in the U.S. were of little importance, since “the euro area is a large economy in 
which economic developments are determined mainly by domestic factors. Overall, the 
                                                         
5 In its recent “Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs,” the European Commission (2005) acknowledges that 
“the economic recovery has to a large extent been dependent upon the resurgence of global growth and the rapid 
increase in world trade” (p. 3), but goes on to “call for a focus on reforms to raise the Union’s growth potential, 
while maintaining sound macroeconomic policies that underpin the success of reform efforts” (p. 6). In the 
Commission’s view, “sound macroeconomic policies are essential to support a well-balanced economic expansion 
and the full realisation of current growth potential” (p. 13). So perhaps one should take more seriously the 




fundamentals in the euro area remain broadly favorable (ECB, February Monthly Bulletin, 
2001, p. 5). After years of domestic demand stagnation Mr. Trichet appeared to look for help 
elsewhere when he referred to the following “normal sequence of events” in an interview: 
“Growth starts with exports, then passes on to investment and then to consumption. That is the 
normal sequence for Europe in this phase of the cycle” (Financial Times, 22 April 2004).  
 It  was true for Germany: during much of its post-war history price stability, in a way, 
caused growth. It is this experience that has imprinted itself on Mr. Issing’s mind. Reflecting 
this misunderstanding and fateful illusions about the past, the ECB mantra was framed that price 
stability always and everywhere, it seems, causes growth, as was announced at the euro’s 
launch: “Maintaining price stability in itself contributes to the achievement of output and 
employment goals” (ECB, Monthly Bulletin January 1999, p. 40; emphasis added). Similarly, 
recalling no doubt his Dutch experiences,
6 Mr. Duisenberg explained that “… we always 
maintain—and we still do—that the best contribution that monetary policy can give to fulfil that 
second task is to maintain price stability” (Duisenberg, Monetary Dialogue, March 2001).  
No wonder Anglo-Saxon ECB watchers trained in mainstream economic theory have a 
hard time making sense of the ECB’s price stability mantra: “In this remarkable interpretation of 
the Treaty, the ECB fulfils its double mandate by reducing it to a single responsibility, a focus 
solely on price stability. All other objectives are then realized automatically. In this view the 
ECB cannot be held responsible for what happens in the real economy. We consider that this 
view is not just narrow, but mistaken” (CEPR 2002, p. 12).  
  Indeed, a mistaken view when seen from a mainstream perspective. Yet what is puzzling 
is that the same critical observers then try to portray the ECB as an inflation targeter in disguise, 
and one with a “nearly impeccable record” too. Time to face reality. The ECB is neither an 
inflation targeter, nor does it have a nearly impeccable record to show for its peculiar religion. 
Rather, the ECB’s performance has featured a series of policy blunders that have left the 
economic giant euro zone stranded in stagnation and at the mercy of the rest of the world.  
 
                                                         
6 Perhaps most memorable of Mr. Duisenberg’s remarks is that: “In the 16 years that I was the Governor of the 
central bank of the Netherlands, there were two years in which we had deflation of 0.5%. I publicly declared then 
that I lived in a central banker’s paradise; as long as the others have more inflation, it is not a problem” (W. 




REVISITING THE ECB’S KEY POLICY BLUNDERS 
 
It seems fair to acknowledge here that the Bundesbank’s legacies confronting the ECB at the 
start of 1999 would have presented any central bankers with a formidable challenge. After the 
monetary overkill in response to German unification, followed by very sluggish interest rate 
cuts, which had left Germany in the doldrums by the mid-nineties, the Bundesbank for no good 
reason then proved all too keen to hike interest rates in October 1997. By that time Germany 
was barely emerging from stagnation—thanks to U.S.-sponsored export growth. When only a 
little later Germany was then hit by the Asian and Russian crises, the Bundesbank exemplified 
the peculiar tradition referred to above: it simply refused to cut interest rates; much in contrast 
to central banks like the U.S. Fed and the Bank of England. And on top of its failure to ease, the 
Bundesbank’s communications even invited DM appreciation—in time for the euro to start from 
what was soon seen as too high a level, and with Germany dubbed the “sick man of the euro.”  
The ECB was not up to this challenge. The bank’s performance since the start is best 
described as a series of policy blunders that pushed inflation up and GDP growth down.
7 The 
first blunder consisted of a clash between the ECB and financial markets, which resulted in a 
marked depreciation of the euro. The second featured the bank’s refusal to cut interest rates and 
boost growth, which resulted in a productivity slump that pushed up unit labor costs. And the 
third blunder witnessed the ECB’s continued refusal to cut interest rates so as to stimulate a 
recovery, which saw fiscal policy, constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact, shifting into 
reverse gear, prompting increases in indirect taxes and administered prices; apart from further 
destabilizing the euro zone. This series of policy blunders pushed inflation up and left Euroland 
in a very fragile shape when the dollar’s depreciation prevented the world’s second largest 
economy from free-riding on external demand yet again.   
  As to the euro’s plunge, the ECB’s role was one of acting as a two-fold propagation 
mechanism as the bank’s words and deeds provoked market opposition. I can be brief on the 
bank’s confusing words. Its first president was legendary for his gaffes. No less important was 
that Mr. Issing’s monotone “price stability above all else” anthem was way out of tune with the 
climate in financial markets at the time. The climate was one of growth enthusiasm, with 
inflation risks not seen as any serious threat. So when the ECB backed up its confusing words 
                                                         




with all too clear actions, nearly doubling interest rates within less than a year, the markets 
simply took fright, preferring policymakers that were perceived as more growth friendly.  
  Interestingly, the risks and foreseeable consequences of euro-weakening interest rate 
hikes
8 were clearly spelled out by the very authority that—later on—forgot all about it and today 
blames the whole malaise on structural problems. In its 2000 review of the EU economy, the 
European Commission vigilantly observed: “To the extent that the depreciation in the euro is 
due to cyclical divergence between the euro area and the United States, a rise in interest rates in 
an attempt to support the currency could even backfire if it was perceived as stifling the euro-
area recovery. The risk of creating an even more unbalanced growth pattern with weak domestic 




  Similarly, the BIS’s Annual Report (2001: 89) observed that: “On balance, market 
participants may have considered the Eurosystem’s monetary policy stance to be excessively 
tight inasmuch as it may have negatively influenced the outlook for euro area growth.” 
Meanwhile the OECD (2001: 106) referred to a “countervailing impact of interest rates on 
exchange rates via growth expectations” and an “unpleasant monetary policy dilemma” (118). 
                                                         




Box 1 summarizes blunder no. 1. Notice that the ECB managed to push inflation up 
while choking domestic demand through its aggressive hikes.
9  
 
Figure 1. Doing it the ECB way











































































































6 Final Domestic Demand (contr. to GDP
growth)
ECB key policy rate (in percent)
 
At least to some observers inflation above 2 percent seemed to justify the bank’s 
subsequent refusal to cut rates as fast as it had hiked them, nicely illustrating the Bundesbank 
tradition of “quick to hike, slow to cut” (see figure 1).
10 The trouble is that the ECB’s “wait and 
see” attitude (when it comes to easing) then provoked a severe productivity slowdown and a 
corresponding rise in unit-labor costs. Facing falling sales business was under pressure to 
                                                         
9 I use interest rates here as shorthand for the whole transmission mechanism of monetary policy rather than the 
interest-rate channel alone; the effectiveness of which some researchers seem to doubt. The ECB’s (2002) research 
on the transmission mechanism has revealed a strong impact of interest rates on domestic demand, primarily 
investment.   
10 The ECB’s commentaries show that the bank was not just out of touch with financial markets, but also with 
developments in the economy.  The January 2001 Bulletin’s editorial discussed the U.S. Fed’s first 50 basis points 
cut of 3 January 2001 with reference to increasing uncertainty surrounding the economic growth performance in the 
U.S., but in February the ECB declared: “While this deceleration will have some dampening effects on euro area 
net exports, the euro area is a large economy in which economic developments are determined mainly by domestic 
factors. Overall, the fundamentals in the euro area remain broadly favourable” (ECB Monthly Bulletin February 
2001:, p5). Confirming this assessment in the March 2001 Bulletin, the ECB referred to an “element of uncertainty” 
as regards the world economy but argued that “at this juncture, there are no signs that the slowdown in the U.S. 
economy is having significant and lasting spillover effects on the euro area.” As the euro’s plunge extended the 
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keeping margins up. While the euro’s plunge pushed up headline inflation through magnifying 
the price effects of high oil prices and rising import prices more generally, blunder no. 2 saw to 
it that core inflation followed suit in 2001 (see figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Business of keeping up margins

































Notes: Index of negotiated wages refers to collectively agreed wage rises. Unit labor costs are shown as a 































It is noteworthy here that wage inflation has remained low and stable throughout, so low 
really as to leave little scope for further falls. While certain interests may be fond of the idea of 
independent central bankers as a disciplining device for punishing labor in case of misbehavior, 
it must be stressed here that the ECB was keen enough to apply pre-emptive punishment. 
Clearly, with this kind of attitude any potential benefits of wage moderation are wasted. The 
hoped-for employment gains simply do not materialize. Even worse, employees—who are also 
consumers!—are then punished twice, namely by moderate wage increases as well as job losses 
(or the fear thereof).  
                                                                                                                                                                                       
export boom, domestic demand tanked; seemingly unnoticed by those who had enacted stability-oriented monetary 




No less a worry is that protracted stagnation and rising unemployment are bound to 
cause budgetary troubles. And this is where the ECB’s blunder no. 3 comes in. A sound 
monetary policymaker internalizes fiscal policy. Given Euroland’s fiscal regime, ill-named the 
Stability and Growth Pact, it was clear from the start that the ECB had to shoulder the bulk of 
the stabilization burden—or else face the consequences of a destabilized economy. The IMF’s 
head at the time, Horst Koehler, even reminded the ECB of this textbook wisdom, when he 
explained that monetary policy would be “the first line of defence.” Mr. Duisenberg responded 
that he had never heard of that (“Duisenberg defends holding rates steady”; Wall Street Journal 
Europe, 9 October 2002).
 
Figure 3. Reneging on growth may not pay off


































Note. Taxes on tobacco products and measure of administered prices within the services sector 

































Ignorance about economic theory may backfire in a nasty way. Most likely, had Mr. 
Duisenberg taken aboard Mr. Koehler’s advice, he would not be remembered today as the ECB 
president who understood how to confuse financial markets but failed on his “sole” price 




protracted stagnation that inflation has stayed stubbornly above 2 percent ever since. In this 
regard, Figure 3 reveals a conspicuous gap that has opened up since 2001 between headline 
inflation and what may be seen as market-determined (as opposed to government-determined) 
inflation. Rises in indirect taxes and administered prices, reflecting finance ministers’ desperate 
but vain attempts at keeping budget deficits below 3 percent, led to an upward distortion in 
headline inflation that reached 0.7 percentage points by the end of 2004. Without “tax-push 
inflation” the ECB would not have failed on its price stability mandate in the last four years.  
 
 
Box no. 2 summarizes the counterproductive interaction between fiscal and monetary 
policies of recent years, featuring a stability-oriented vicious circle with tax-push inflation as the 
key symptom in a macroeconomic policy blunder that has left the euro area stranded in 
stagnation—with inflation persistently above the set limit of 2 percent.   




WOULD INFLATION TARGETING HAVE MADE OR MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE? 
 
While the possibility of misreading the markets can never be excluded, an inflation targeter will 
be cautious enough not to unnecessarily provoke market opposition so as to crash the currency 
and push inflation up. Nor would a sound inflation targeter carelessly and needlessly provoke a 
productivity slump that pushes inflation up. Finally, a proper inflation targeter internalizes fiscal 
policy, especially when ignoring stagnation and unemployment results in a fiscal squeeze that 
pushes inflation up. In other words, even for the sake of maintaining price stability a proper 
inflation targeter has an interest in sustaining growth and employment, and thereby low 
inflation. Unfortunately, the ECB is not an inflation targeter, and this article can be seen as a 
call on those who make such claims to reconsider that view.  
One key element in inflation targeting is that it prescribes a properly forward-looking 
policy conduct. It is about keeping tomorrow’s rather than yesterday’s inflation stable around 
some announced target, and thus also called inflation forecast targeting (Svensson 1997). 
Current or past inflation only matter in so far as they provide information about future inflation. 
While any forward-looking monetary policy must inevitably be based on a forecast, under 
inflation targeting the inflation forecast takes centre-stage in the policymaking process and 
policy communication. Policy is thereby made transparent, allowing accountability for 
performance. Another key element is the emphasis on symmetry in this approach, as deviations 
in either direction of the target inflation rate are equally unwelcome. Neither of these key 
features describes the ECB’s conduct well.   
 Importantly,  any short-term inflation forecast—as providing the basis for determining 
and communicating the policy stance under this strategy—must inevitably be derived from a 
forecast of the economy’s evolution over the relevant time horizon. It is the evolution of the 
economy that the monetary policymakers attempt to steer by applying their interest rate tool. 
Effectively, inflation targeting means actively managing aggregate demand and employment, 
and thereby inflation.  
So there is no denying that, conceptually, inflation targeting is little else but fine tuning 
the economy by means of monetary policy. It is all about optimally adjusting the policy 
instrument (i.e. interest rate) so as to stabilize the economy through deliberate demand 
management, with continuously updated and published inflation forecasts providing the key 




inflation targeting is fine tuning in the sense that anything but optimally adjusting the instrument 
aimed at steering the economy along some desired path would be irrational. Obviously this does 
not mean that it would ever be possible to actually fine tune the economy precisely on that path.  
No doubt this driving style requires skills and competence. The Bank of England has 
been a successful pioneer of this approach since Black Wednesday in September 1992. Today, 
the Bank of England is generally seen as a model of transparency and openness in all respects. 
Its conduct features relatively frequent and symmetric interest rate reactions to economic 
developments. It readiness to ease in adverse circumstances prepares the ground for appropriate 
tightening as growth resumes. The UK is blessed with a fairly smooth cooperation between 
monetary and fiscal policies, while wage earners enjoy wage increases in line with GDP growth. 
Overall, both nominal and real GDP growth have been very stable, with employment high and 
inflation low throughout. If the EMU outsider’s economy is marred with imbalances today, 
these are largely due to its key external problem: having to operate in the immediate vicinity of 
a stagnating economic giant, destination of half of its exports.   
  If the UK is seen as the inflation targeting model for the ECB to follow, there is one 
aspect in which the two economies seem to differ that is pertinent to inflation targeting: UK 
wage inflation appears to be somewhat more responsive to the state of the economy than is the 
case in Euroland. It would be wrong though to focus on the higher degree of downward wage 
“flexibility” only, as is commonly done when comparing Euroland’s famous wage rigidities 
with more flexible conditions in the UK and U.S. The point is that wage inflation is more 
flexible in either direction in those economies. Whereas euro zone wage inflation remained 
stable at a very low level since the mid-nineties, wages rose significantly faster in “flexible” 
economies in good times. Accordingly, wage inflation had more room for slowing down than in 
Euroland since 2001. To blame rigid wage inflation for Euroland’s stagnation-cum-inflation 
persistence misses the point unless one is wishing for outright wage deflation.  
  This labor market feature matters greatly to monetary policy generally and inflation 
targeting in particular. When a growth slowdown or recession appears on the Bank of England’s 
radar screen it is safe to forecast a slowdown in wage and price inflation. Appropriately pre-
emptive easing then tends to stabilize the economy. By contrast, in Euroland a forecasted 
growth slowdown may not herald any significant decline in inflation, particularly as wage 
inflation is low and stable anyhow. It does not follow that an inflation targeter should not ease 




of a negative demand shock will be largely real. Paired with a general reluctance to use the 
accelerator, unemployment is doomed to persist and become labelled “structural.”  
It thus becomes evident how very problematic the ECB’s asymmetric mindset really is: it 
is bound to cause hysteresis—the process by which cyclical unemployment becomes 
“structural” as workers lose their skills and become “discouraged” from participating in the 
labor market while depressed business investment leaves a permanent gap in the economy’s 
capital stock too—and thus represents the antipode to an employment-friendly monetary policy 
regime.
11 So let me emphasize that it would be wrong to criticize the ECB for not being forward 
looking. For when it comes to forecasting a recovery in growth and inflation risks the ECB is 
extremely forward looking. Ever since 2001 the ECB has forecast the economy to recover to its 
growth potential in the course of the current or following year—despite those allegedly all-
pervasive structural problems. Ignoring any negative output gap that may have opened up in 
years of stagnation, even the imagination of a future return of GDP growth to the postulated 
trend makes the inflation alert flash red in Frankfurt. This kind of hysteria about inflation risks 
is replaced by a remarkable complacency when it comes to stagnation and deflation risks.  
  Ironically, the ECB can only “afford” this complacency because Euroland’s wage 
rigidities provide it with a safety net against deflation risks. The more flexible wage inflation, 
the greater the required safety margin to stay clear of the deflationary abyss. When U.S. 
inflation fell below 2 percent in 2002, the U.S. Fed’s deflation alert flashed red and emergency 
measures were taken. The ECB, by contrast, defines 2 percent as the ceiling of its inflation 
comfort zone. Operating within the flat range of a nonlinear supply curve does not imply that 
less pre-emptiveness with respect to negative demand shocks would be justified. It just means 
that deflation risks will not easily materialize—but the real damages will be no less real.  
  Keynes argued in chapter 19 of The General Theory that a stable wage unit would tend 
to simplify the conduct of monetary policy and reduce the risk of systemic instability. 
Unfortunately a stable wage unit also makes it easier for central bankers to free-ride on—what is 
effectively—a rather convenient safety net against deflation risks. Figure 4 summarizes the 
issues involved here, highlighting that two criticisms of the ECB’s policy conduct must not be 
confused. One concerns the level of the ECB’s price stability definition, which is probably too 




(2001). Arguably, the asymmetry in the ECB’s approach emphasized here is even more costly. 
It was due to this asymmetry that the ECB managed to actually shift the supply curve and 
inflation up when its disrespect for growth backfired on its sole goal of price stability through 




  No doubt the ECB’s record of keeping inflation above 2 percent for five years in a row 
represents something of a miracle. With wage inflation so very low and stable as has been the 
case in Euroland since the mid-1990s, maintaining price stability would seem like a fool’s job.  
Given the ECB’s peculiar driving style it is not surprising that Euroland is getting nowhere on 
its aspired Lisbon growth route. Not the engine is stuttering though, it is the driver who lacks 
proper driving skills.  
It is less obvious that the ECB’s anti-growth bias also acted as a brake that kept inflation 
from falling more quickly toward levels more in line with severely depressed wage inflation. I 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
11 Apart from Ball (1997, 1999), it is worthwhile here to recall James Tobin’s (1994) prediction that “the European 
example [of gearing] monetary policy exclusively to price stability … has been very costly in Europe, and it is 




argued above that even for the sake of maintaining price stability, a proper inflation targeter has 
an interest in sustaining growth and employment, and thereby low inflation. It is an interesting 
thought to consider what would be the case today if Euroland had been under the monetary 
stewardship of a more competent driver, say the Bank of England.  
Most likely inflation would be lower and interest rates higher today than they actually 
are. For it is through pre-emptive easing in view of growth risks that symmetrically forward-
looking central banks nourish recoveries and thereby the basis for corresponding interest rate 
rises. And now, once again proving its keenness to hike for no good reason when it has never 
shown readiness to cut in time, the “ECB itches to raise rates, but why?” (International Herald 
Tribune, 5 April 2005). The ECB thus seems busy preparing its next blunder. Against this 
background, rather than single-mindedly pushing for labor market liberalizations that would 
only further undermine the ECB’s safety net against deflation risks, policymakers should 
consider reforming Euroland’s real key structural problem.  
 
PROPOSALS FOR ECB REFORM  
 
Structural reform in Euroland should focus on the key flaws in central banking institutions 
currently in place. In particular, the primary goal of policy reform should be to end the 
antiquated Bundesbank-type of central bank independence and peculiar despotism in monetary 
policy, representing the Maastricht paradox: “Starting from an overriding principle of 
disciplining policymakers as the foundation of stability, the ECB ended up as the ‘benevolent 
dictator’ in the scheme” (Bibow 2002: 33), enjoying unbounded discretion. In all too many 
respects the experience with the ECB has validated Milton Friedman’s observation on the 
popular but thoroughly ill-conceived “time-inconsistency theme” that “from revealed 
preference, I suspect that by far and away the two most important variables in [typical 
policymakers’] loss function are avoiding accountability on the one hand and achieving public 
prestige on the other” (quoted in Bibow 2004a: 566). Indeed, the existing Bundesbank model is 
both undemocratic and economically inefficient. Reforms should take their cue from the U.K.’s 
monetary structure, which makes it clear who is master and who is servant.  
  While proper structural reform would require rewriting the Treaty, a more practicable 
way forward even within the existing regime might be to impose inflation targeting upon the 




should make this possible. There is nothing in the Treaty that says that it has to be left to the 
ECB to define price stability and get away with the most idiosyncratic interpretation of its 
stabilization and growth mandate.
12  
  The very least the euro zone’s governments could do without facing any obstacles 
whatever, and this would be an important input in any case, is to end the sad series of “accidents 
of personality” that has afflicted continental European monetary policymaking for all too long 
now. After all, it is governments’ responsibility to select central bankers who are willing and 
able to do what they have to do, namely to manage the economy and thereby inflation. A key 
event in this respect is coming up in the spring of 2006, when the chance will arise to fill the 
position of ECB chief economist with an economist who understands this. The ECB’s 
unbounded discretion might then allow the bank to quite voluntarily start doing a proper job—if 
it can.  
                                                         
12 I propose this here as a practicable way forward even though I would prefer a U.S. Fed-style dual mandate. See 
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